Formal semantic theories employ mathematical resources and methods that enable a precise integration between the syntactic and semantic components of formal languages within logical systems. This precision raises the following question guiding this dissertation: What are the possibilities and limitations of developing and applying a formal semantic theory aimed at conceptualizing a linguistic simulation (a theoretical model that mathematically captures the functioning of human linguistic ability)? Before delving into any answers, it is essential to highlight that achieving such a purpose depends on a formal definition of the notion of truth, as in the pertinent semantic theory, the concept of truth is a core from which other semantic notions are defined, such as logical consequence. Faced with this dependence, the emerging problem is that natural languages are syntactically non-mathematizable and semantically closed, making it challenging to maintain these characteristics in a linguistic simulation, hindering a formally correct definition of the truth concept. From this perspective, the response to the above question is that the application of a formal semantic theory would not facilitate the conception of a linguistic simulation. However, in this pessimistic scenario, by limiting the project's scope, simulation became feasible by relying on the formalization of a syntactically mathematizable declarative linguistic fragment that preserves semantic openness. Thus, the stated problem was successfully addressed, precisely delineating the possibilities and limitations of the intended linguistic simulation. In this process, it was possible to conceive a linguistic simulation, SL, through a linguistic simulator constructed from a hybrid formal semantic theory. Having fulfilled the designated task, concluding remarks were articulated, suggesting that SL does not fulfill the function of, from a logicalmathematical perspective, explicitly detailing and explaining the intricate array of properties encompassing the functioning of human linguistic ability. However, despite its limitations, SL succeeds to some extent, as it stems from a hybrid formal semantics that can gradually be expanded and, thus, applied to conceive simulations incorporating increasingly inherent properties of linguistic ability.

This work focuses on the in-depth exploration of the concept of transference in Jacques Lacan, with a central focus on Seminar VIII, in which the renowned French psychoanalyst innovatively addresses this theme, drawing reference from Plato's Symposium. The main objective is to analyze the intricate relationship between transference, love, desire, and knowledge, as interpreted by Lacan in his original and unorthodox reading of the Platonic dialogue, with a special emphasis on the interaction between the characters Socrates and Alcibiades. In this sense, the Symposium, by directly addressing love and desire in their relation to lack, provides Lacan with fertile ground to investigate the complex dynamics of transference. Initially, this study highlights the centrality of
transference love in psychoanalytic theory, emphasizing its relevance to clinical practice, as established by Sigmund Freud. It then discusses the notions of transference and countertransference in their intersection with love and desire in Lacanian works preceding Seminar VIII, contextualizing the development of these two clinical concepts within a conflicted relationship marked by dissensions between Lacan and other post-Freudian psychoanalysts. Lacan's reading of the Symposium is characterized by apparent contradictions, contrasts, ambiguities, non-evident meanings, and senses that do not close in a definition. This may initially create confusion for readers but, in turn, is capable of creating a network of signifiers where ideas are continually thought and reformulated. An example of this is the term "agalma" taken from the Symposium, which is compared to the concept of a partial object, the object of desire around which clinical transference revolves. By addressing the intricate interrelation between transference, love, desire, and knowledge, this dissertation aims to provide a deeper understanding of Lacan's contribution to psychoanalytic theory. Additionally, it proposes a critical reflection on the apparent contradictions and innovations introduced by Lacan, challenging established paradigms and contributing to a more comprehensive understanding of the clinical complexity involving transference, as well as the role of the analyst and his desire.

The quantum theory developed in the first half of the twentieth century – since the works of Max Planck and other physicists such as Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg, J. Von Neumann and Erwin Schrödinger – presented a series of unprecedented experimental situations, which showed themselves resistant to the classical normative determination, both with regard to some laws of Newtonian physics, and with regard to fundamental categories of modern epistemology. This situation instituted in the scientific environment problems that were previously treated in a philosophical context, so that philosophers such as Karl Popper illustrated this situation by referring to it as an “epistemological crisis”, which can be read as a problem about the objectivity of the quantum theory in face of dissensions related to its completeness, the belonging or not of attributes to unobserved quantum phenomena and the unavoidable necessity to communicate experimental events in classical terms. In this context, both the so-called “analytical philosophers” and physicists sought to build epistemological theories that could handle the experimental situation without the need to resort to classical theories. However, the success of these attempts, such as R. Carnap's “double language” solution, is questionable. In this sense, some epistemologists sought to address the epistemological problems raised by quantum theory from the perspective of an update of Kant's transcendental philosophy, as an alternative solution for the evaluation of the epistemological problems of quantum theory. The present investigation is part of this updating itinerary, based on a semantic reading of transcendental philosophy, in order to make an unorthodox use of what transcendental semantics can still provide for the treatment of the problem of objectivity in quantum theory and the defense of a pragmatic dimension of this semantics with regard to applications of quantum theory in modern chemistry.

Structured into four chapters, this work presents a study on Identity and Relationship in Paul Ricoeur. Given the breadth of the theme, we place it around the work Soi-même comme un autre, with the self as a reference and the purpose of exploring its ontological status through the themes of Identity and Relationship. These themes presuppose an ontology, a way of being that, in Ricoeur, is not given immediately, as it implies following a long path. Therefore, our exposition begins with a general characterization of the philosophy of the self, in which we indicate the self of the question, we say that the understanding of this self is mediated and that its identity is said in terms of sameness and ipseity. Through specification efforts, we began to identify,
individualize and recognize the self, demonstrating that the self is personal, singularized by action and recognized in its capabilities, despite its vulnerabilities. Thus, we have a reflective and practical self, whose form of narrative and personal identity is best expressed in terms of ipseity which, given its relational nature, takes alterity and sociality into account, in a common sphere of ethics. Along this path, we sought to highlight the ontological incidences of the philosophy of the self, which can also be called strategies for approaching the self. Once this is done, we enter the ‘promised land’ with the meta prefix of metaphysics as the threshold. Next, we give voice to the metacategories Identity and Relationship, taken as notions of the history of being, interpreted and assumed by Paul Ricoeur. Finally, we deal with the alethic character of the self as a necessary truth claim about the type of being it is. We then arrive at the statement that the self is a figure of the cogito, mediated by language and action, whose identity is relational, which shows in action a fundamental way of being. Therefore, the ontology of the self is polysemic, relational and current, whose manifestations take place on an existential horizon.

This doctoral thesis, Foucault’s Critical Thought, aims to present the reasons why the philosophy of Michel Foucault can be considered, as he states, a critical history of thought, or simply, critical thought. However, even though it may be evident that the philosopher critiques a series of practices, conceptions, attitudes, and historical conditions, it is not such an easy or simple task to demonstrate how or for what purpose the critique is exercised in Foucault’s philosophy. Recognizing this situation leads to the hypothesis of this thesis, intending to understand critical thought in two stages: the first stage is to describe the notions of critique in the context of the framework of concepts mobilized by Foucault; the second stage is to interpret the interest in addressing certain themes according to a defined purpose. To accomplish this hypothesis, this thesis relies
on the use of two axes. The analytical axis serves as a descriptive method concerning the notions of critique recorded by Foucault, favoring a didactic reading; this means adopting the famous division of Foucault’s philosophy into phases: archaeology of knowledge, genealogy of power, and what is called the ‘last Foucault’ of ethical subjectivity. This thesis identifies a notion of critique corresponding to each mentioned phase: a critique of the ‘philosophy of suspicion’, a critique of the experimental procedure, and a critique as an attitude (critique) of the last phase. However, it is not enough to establish some notions of critique for a thought to be truly, critical. Therefore, the heuristic axis carries out another idea and serves another function in this thesis. The idea is to meet Foucault’s criteria and use his ‘toolbox’, addressing a set of concepts that are considered by the philosopher himself as guidelines for his way of philosophizing. The function that the heuristic axis carries out emulates an interpretative method but with the peculiarity of executing an interpretation of the way Foucault interprets his philosophy. In this case, it is possible to identify three interpretative modalities: forms of problematization, foyers of experience, and the last one that requires the effort of this thesis to be presented, the means of transformation of the self. The conclusion of this thesis points to the articulation
of these two axes to arrive at an understanding of Foucault’s critical thought that considers the notions of critique elaborated by the philosopher as well as considers the defined purposes to make his philosophy a critical thought.

The advances of modern logic, in part attributed to the German philosopher Gottlob Frege, allowed us to fully develop the intuitive notion of classical axiomatic into the rough and precise theoretical objects that are the formal axiomatic systems. However,the technical evolution of these constructions moved away from their basic elements, suchas theirown language,the metaphysicalgroundingthatwould guarantee the passage from the syntactic to the semantic.Nevertheless, Gödel's Incompleteness Theoremssuggest that there is a scope of the notion of truth that escapes and,hence, that cannot be captured only by the formal apparatus of axiomatic theories.Thisis an indication that formal systems can be seen as formalizations of concepts, and that this scope of meaning must play an important role in the foundation of these objects.Therefore,the present work is motivated by the investigation about this mismatch between the layer of meaning and the syntactic layer of formal systems. It is impossible to denythe importance and relevance of formal systems to a lot of areas, such as mathematics and computing, for instance; thus, it is, indeed, necessary the study that aims to understandbetterthe nature of these objects, going beyond of its instrumental and syntactic use.

This work proposes to examine the historical connection and the path of phenomenology from Brentano and Husserl to the philosophy of Jean Héring, as well as to understand the influence of nascent phenomenology in relation to religious experience, more specifically the nature and object of phenomena mental involved in this experience. This examination constitutes an investigation about the concept of intentionality as the guiding thread that weaves the philosophical thinking of these authors. This concept was reintroduced by Franz Brentano in the foundation of his psychology as a science, a proposal that arose from the departure from Kantian philosophy and positivism. The epistemology arising from this foundation becomes the principles of twentieth-century phenomenology. In this wake of philosophical thinking, Jean Héring (1890-1966), a  tudent of Husserl in Göttingen, applied the principles and concepts of phenomenology in his analysis of religious experience in order to distinguish and delimit the field of religious philosophy in view of fundamentally it as a no less important knowledge compared to those influenced by positivism, by psychologism. Consequently, he set out to describe and elucidate the nature and object of the religious sphere as a sui generis experience by presenting the criteria and authenticity of that experience due to the help of phenomenology.

The Edith Stein’s work “The structure of the human person” aims to ground the pedagogy on an anthropological philosophy. This is why this dissertation begins with the question “What is the man?” and then advances to “How we must form him?”. Actually, this last question cannot be answered without the first. Guided by the phenomenological method and the thomistic philosophy, Stein describes the human person as a unity of body, soul and spirit. As we investigate each one of these dimensions, we will understand the specificity of the human person and the specificity of his formation in relation to the others “realms of being” – material, vegetable, animal and purely spiritual. Finally, we will also verify the necessity to consider, in our anthropological investigation, the social dimension of the human person, as well as to welcome the christian revelation as a necessary complement and guide for anthropology and for pedagogy. Indeed, for Stein, both depend on a supernatural source of knowledges, without which it is not possible to understand the first origin, the profound essence and the ultimate mission of the human person.

Existential Psychoanalysis is one of the last subjects addressed in the work Being and Nothingness (1943) by philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre. Despite the clear Freudian inspiration, Sartre will propose an interpretation of human behavior based on an ontophenomenological foundation of man and the world. This paper will try to present the close ties between the French philosopher and the German Edmund Husserl (1859- 1938), explaining how Sartre absorbed the phenomenological ideas and what is the scope of these ideas within his philosophy. We will expose the author's main philosophical notions that sustain his psychoanalytic proposal, making some references to Freudian psychoanalysis, but with the intention of highlighting the originality of Sartre's notion of consciousness built throughout his works. We will also establish an interlocution with Georges Politzer in order to find similarities between Sartre's proposal and the critical movement made by the thinker in relation to the theoretical canons of the field of psychology. In this way, we intend to locate the existentialist philosopher among those intellectuals who tried to reorient the paradigms of human sciences based on the existentialist works. Therefore, the purpose of this dissertation is to understand what implications the Sartrian conception of consciousness can have in the field of human sciences and how Sartrian existentialism can be useful in the understanding of society and contemporary human beings.

The concept of teleology is paramount to our understanding of Aristotle’s Natural Philosophy. For him, natural processes are end-oriented: they occur for the sake of some end. A passage in Politics I 8 (1256b15-22) is often referred to as evidence for the apparently anthropocentric nature of his teleological views: plants are for the sake of animal food and non-human animals are for the sake of human food and human conveniences. I tried to show that Aristotle’s notion of teleology is more nuanced and sophisticated than what a superficial reading of this passage may seem to support. I argued that (i) the notion of ‘cause’ must be understood not only within the modern framework of causation laws, but also within the broader context of explanations; and
that (ii) for Aristotle, there are two kinds of ‘ends’ (or ‘that for the sake of which’): the end as an objective and the end as a beneficiary.

The Master’s thesis treats Immanuel Kant's concept of empirical reality. The first part deals with the problem of defining reality, what it really is. The Danish-Swiss philosophers Anton Hügli and Poul Lübcke propose a classification of reality viewed from different aspects and show how difficult it is to define what reality actually is. Immanuel Kant dialogues with each of their definitions, as he has several comments on what Hügli and Lübcke have to say about reality. Empirical and objective reality is presented in the next segment, followed by the presentation of the concepts of Realität and Wirklichkeit. They are somewhat problematic from a linguistic point of view, as they are two different concepts in German, but in other languages they are translated by the same word. In the section on Transcendental Idealism, space and time and their role as

forms of pure intuitions are presented, as well as their important part as preconditions for reality. The next part deals with the problem of empirical realism, probably the most complicated part of the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant is known for having detected his own form of categories, which differ from those developed by Aristotle. While Aristotle's categories are a form of being, Kant's are necessary for thinking and cognition. But the categories cannot exist on their own to make reality recognisable. They need to be schematised and then applied in space and time to provide cognition about the (external) world and reality in which the subject lives. This is followed by the question of what the "real" is and what role the axioms of intuition and the anticipation of perception play in answering this question

In this study, we look for the main philosophical sources that inspire Saint Augustine (354-430) in his Letter 7. Written between the years 388 and 391, Letter 7 belongs to the same intellectual period that we find, for example, in De Musica (387-391), De Magistro (389) and De Vera Religione (390/391). Letter 7 stands out, in the vast Augustinian corpus, as one of the most relevant texts for the study of the issue of memory, a study that will reach its most complete development in book X of the Confessiones (397-401) and in the last books of De Trinitate (399-419). One of the most fundamental questions in Augustinian thought, memory implies many others, as we can see in Letter 7. Among other, we find: reminiscence and the preexistence of the soul, time and eternity, the sensation and divine illumination, and, mainly, imagination (phantasia/imaginatio). As far as sources are concerning, as these topics are presented in Letter 7, we seek to find, understand and demonstrate their main philosophical influences. For instance, Plato (427-347) is nominally present in Letter 7; Aristotle (384-322) can be seen both in Nebridius, the keen author of the questions that evoke Letter 7, and in Augustine; the Stoics (3rd century BC to 2nd century AD), usually via Cicero (106-43), also appear on the basis of some conceptual distinctions; and Plotinus (205-270) and Porphyry (c. 232-305) are the most prominent names among Augustine’s philosophical sources. Thus, if the work with the sources is significant to better understand the issues exposed in Letter 7, it is also significant, perhaps even more so, to perceive the way Augustine takes these sources as, not rarely, we point out, that since Letter 7 he uses them with great originality.

William Alston¹ defends the idea that mystical experiences reinforce the belief in God in theistic religions and that religious beliefs are formed from mystical doxastic practices, that is, practices that form religious beliefs, such as tradition, the reading of scriptures, the testimony of important protagonists in the history of religions and accounts of mystical interaction experiences with God, among other practices. In this sense, the existence of diverse, socially established religions, with their doxastic practices and diverse beliefs pose challenges to the idea of an ultimate and true reality, since they always refer to characteristics of the sacred entity in the way it is described in the religious tradition in which the believer is inserted.

The existence in the world of a plurality of religions inserted in diverse cultural and religious contexts, with varied characterizations of objects of worship, poses a problem for Alston's thesis: how is it possible that religious beliefs formed from doxastic practices and concepts of ultimate reality incompatible in the various socially established religious communities are maintained by their respective believers as prima facie justified, although conflicting with those believed by believers of other religious hues; and further, to what degree this problem would compromise the thesis that religious belief finds reinforcement in mystical experience.

Alston lists some possible solutions to the problem of religious diversity, among which we highlight:

1. Maintain the attitude of epistemic conservatism toward the belief-forming practices of the various religious communities.

2. Accept the hypothesis of Kantian inspiration with cultural content proposed by (Hick, 2018).

3. Adhering to the radical naturalistic hypothesis.

The objective of this thesis is to analyze the relevance of each of the alternatives referred by Alston to deal with the problem in question.

In John Rawls’ Law of Peoples, tolerance has the important role of enabling the conditions for the construction of a stable and peaceful international order. Liberal peoples must, based on the principles of the Law of Peoples, follow a tolerant foreign policy towards peoples who demonstrate themselves to be decent. Liberal tolerance towards these peoples is expressed, initially, in a vertical perspective and, later, in a horizontal perspective, that is, as respect among peoples who recognize each other as equals. Respect for urgent human rights is one of the requirements of the criteria of decency established by liberal peoples that is imposed on all societies, pointing out the limits of liberal tolerance. Due to their commitment to tolerance, which implies respect for the diversity of peoples, liberal peoples should not impose their conception of justice on other peoples, as this undermines the autonomy of well-ordered peoples. As a consequence, the Law of Peoples does not accept principles of global distribution and proposes the duty of assistance with a target and cut-off point, moving away from a conception of global justice. The duty of assistance is an important measure for tackling poverty in burdened societies. However, if the existence of a basic global structure is considered, it is not sufficient to dispense with principles of global justice that promote the distribution of wealth among peoples, as such a structure generates economic interdependence, weakening the Rawlsian argument of peoples’ responsibility for their choices. The Law of Peoples completes John Rawls’ theory of justice developed in the works A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism, and extends to the Society of Peoples the liberal conception of justice formulated for liberal domestic societies, but such an extension does not imply the reproduction of the principles of this conception of justice in a conception of global justice.

The present doctoral Thesis in Philosophy endouvered the investigation of the idea of real political action and its necessary historical conditions for the political acting in Antonio Gramsci. The problematic present to the Thesis is: Which are the gramscian philosophical requirements for the real political action in the philosophy of praxis? The main objective was to show that those requirements allready have been given by history, leaving up to political philosophy taking over the educational task of formation in the masses of the class consciousness and therefore prepare them to overcame the antagonism burgoisie x proletariat. To come to that matter, the Thesis was structured in three chapters as follows. 1) Starting point: political and philosophical pathway, where to show that since his juvenil maturity the reflections about the philosphy of praxis are present. 2) Spontaneity and conscious direction in politics, space granted to anlyse three funding points of gramscian thought: the ideia that every human is a philosopher; that the conscious direction can be preceded by sponteneity; translatability as task sine qua non for the political action to be effective and for the philosophy of praxis to become concrete. 3) Political path to the formation of the New State, when the route is traced among the philosophy of praxis, materialism, and the relation of forces. It was verified, therefore, that the so long awaited revolution demands a long and continous formative process of the masses, whose historical conditions allready have been given by history, leaving up to the worker to unite in order to form a new hegemony in its favor, a new State.

This dissertation intends to investigate the articulation between philosophy and politics within the main works of Hannah Arendt.

Considering that these two disciplines are always in tension or opposition-especially from the perspective of the tradition of philosophical thought, starting with Plato -, the main objective lies in determining whether, based on Arendt's thought, there is any possibility of mediation between them, that is, a conciliation between the faculties of thought and action. In order to achieve thisobjective,a monographic and exegetical approach was chosen,focusing on the relationship between the texts and their historical-philosophical premises, developed towards a critical analysis of the concepts discussed by the author. In other words, the present investigation prioritized, on the one hand, the rigorous exposition of Arendtian theory and, on the other hand, it endeavored to conceive connections between philosophy and politics. To summarize, the first chapter comprises the historical-philosophical investigation of the main events that took place in modernity that, according to Arendt, anticipate and drive the totalitarian experiences of the 20th century. The task consists, at first, in showing, above all, the exhaustion of critical thinking in favor of technical - mathematical knowledge.

Secondly, the present work proposes to relate the emergence of the mass individual with this inability to think-something that will lead to the development, in particular, of the concept ofbanality of evil. Finally, the task will consist of elaborating a hypothesis about the relationship between philosophy and politics, thought and action, and this based on twoparadigms: the first considering Socrates as a model of philosopher and citizen; and the second, taking as inspiration the Kantian guidelines for reformulating the concepts of thought and judgment. The broader purpose is, therefore, to try to indicate analternative for the mediation between these categories,which, according to Arendt, have always been in conflict throughout the tradition of Western political thought.

The concept of constructiveness is often debated in the fields of foundations and philosophy of Mathematics. This work is an attempt to define and analize different approaches to this concept in the context of classical and intuitionistic Mathematics. To do so, we define two approaches, the tradicional and the relative production of sets, and we analyze them in the context of the classical set theory ZFC and the intuitionistic set theories IZF and CZF. We argue that the tradicional approach, defined based on the common use of the term con- structiveness in the context of mathematical practice, is not appropriate to classical theories due to its instability by logical equivalence. In other words, constructive sentences are equiv- alent to non-constructive ones. For intuitionistic theories, which aim to be construtive, we argue that the approach is also not appropriate due to the fact that these theories contain non-constructive sentences according to this approach. The relative production of sets approach does have estability by local equivalence and it is adequate to discuss the constructiveness of sentences. However, its definition is only applicable
to the classical set theory ZFC. We finalize this work with a proposal of an adaptation to the relative production of sets approach that make it applicable to intuitionistic set theories: the minimal models approach.

This work intends to discuss the elements that make up the fundamental lines of the proposal of a cosmopolitanlaw (Weltbürgerrecht) by ImmanuelKant. Introduced in the work Perpetual peace(1795), cosmopolitan lawis define dasarightof hospitality (Hospitalitätsrecht), by which is meant the right of a foreigner not to be treated with hostility because of his arrival in another’s land. The purpose of cosmopolitan law would ultimately
betoregulatetheinteractionbetweenindividualsandstatesincertainsituationsof
interaction. Such conception drove the present investigation in order to try to understandwhy Kant considers as essential that the legal relations between states and foreign individuals be gathered undera singleand comprehensivelegalframework, thatis, gatheredunder cosmopolitan law. In view of this, the dissertation investigates what thespecificityof cosmopolitan law is in the general framework of the formal requirements and conditions of possibility for the proscription of war and the establishment of a state of world peace founded on law. In this respect, it is understood, first, that its specificity consists in regulating interactions between individuals and states in precise situations in which they are not contemplated by the civil law of the state and the international law; second, it is understood that cosmopolitan law represents the legal principle that, by giving rise to the legal figure of worldcitizenship (inadditiontonationalcitizenship), establishes aguiding principle according to which action – whether within a national community of law or an international community of law – must be assessed from the perspective ofpluralism, that is, from the perspective ofwhat is best for the whole world(V-Anth/Mensch, AA 25)rather than what is best for a single person, people or state.

The thesis begins to be drawn from a nuisance: the world as we know it continues to be directed towards environmental, social, and ethical cataclysms. Unfortunately, these assertions are neither moral nor questionable. That is what there is, despite the existence of a community, cultural and economic movements that seek to survive the end of the world. The solutions that we see designed at the most question the need for the end of capitalism, almost always without considering what some theorists have pointed out in different ways: capitalism has a tremendous revolutionary and reifying force in its processes – to which Silvia Federici would add, almost always reactionary. Thus, not only is the world heading towards endless extractability, of natural resources and epistemic resources, but it is also heading towards an increasingly proletarianized, surrounded, and machined existence for the majority of the planet’s inhabitants. When investigating the presuppositions of the modern text, mainly philosophical, as suggested by Denise Ferreira da Silva, I tried to understand what, in ontoepistemological terms, allows the permanence of the world as we know it. This happens given the scenario described, and from the understanding that it is still necessary and always possible to (r)exist – however, not preventing the end of this world, but, on the contrary, contributing to its end (da Silva). I understand, as the authors mobilized in this text – such as the Martinican Édouard Glissant, the AfricanAmerican Saidiya Hartman, and da Silva herself –, the fact that the racial arsenal gestated in modernity is what should end for this world to end. In this sense, the thesis investigates the constitution of otherness in the so-called “modern text”, as well as presents some contemporary discussions that sought to produce thought from what Walter Mignolo called the “colonial difference”. Starting from the diagnosis of the constitution of the transparent self (the constitution of the subject in the postEnlightenment) in da Silva and from the prerogative set by Glissant regarding opacity, I try to draw what would be the end of the racial arsenal and the end of this world from that what is left: the ghosts, the traces, and the specters. For not constituting full presences –“presence” as another name of metaphysics –, for refusing to reify the extractability proclaimed by the modern text, for not inscribing through essentialisms in the philosophical and political thought of transparency, as well as its concomitant emancipatory projects civilizations and those present in contemporary religious fundamentalisms, they are the memories, the traces, the inscriptions that will enable the irruption of the real. The (po)ethics is the formal and material modus with which we deal with the refusal of transparency and reaffirm the right to opacity (Glissant) as the only possible way of being in the world. Thus, the text is an attempt to find – also along with contemporary philosophical-feminist literature – what is left over and what will constitute our new world since the end of raciality.